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COMMENTS




In 1978, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal was forced
to decide whether a competent, terminally ill individual has the
right to refuse or discontinue medical treatment.1 In its well-rea-
soned opinion, that court sharply stated:
Abe Perlmutter should be allowed to make his choice to die with
dignity, notwithstanding over a dozen legislative failures in this
state to adopt suitable legislation in this field. It is all very con-
venient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so that there
can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and no
possible trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite another
matter to do so at the patient's sole expense and against his com-
petent will, thus inflicting never ending physical torture on his
body until the inevitable, but artificially suspended, moment of
death. Such a course of conduct invades the patient's constitu-
tional right of privacy, removes his freedom of choice and invades
his right to self-determination.2
Despite the obvious need for legislative guidance on natural
death questions, the legislature did not speak determinatively on
the issue until recently. Every session of the Florida legislature be-
tween 1969 and 1982 considered some variation of natural death
legislation. 3 However, with the exception of the 1973 legislative
1. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980). For further discussion of Perlmutter, see Note, Florida's Right To Die-A Question
of Litigation or Legislation?, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 111 (1980).
2. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 164.
3. Law regarding the issues herein addressed has been referred to interchangeably as
natural death, right to die, and death with dignity legislation. Regarding aborted attempts
at legislation in Florida, see Fla. HB 841 (1982); Fla. SB 72 (1982); Fla. HB 574 (1981); Fla.
SB 149 (1981); Fla. HB 463 (1980); Fla. SB 446 (1980); Fla. HB 740 (1979); Fla. HB 8
(1978); Fla. HR 374 (1977); Fla. HR 2463 (1976); Fla. HJR 2575 (1976); Fla. HR 3703 (1976);
Fla. SR 513 (1976); Fla. HB 239 (1975); Fla. HJR 3007 (1974); Fla. HB 407 (1973); Fla. HR
2614 (1972); Fla. HR 2830 (1972); Fla. HB 68 (1971); Fla. HR 3184 (1970); Fla. HJR 91
(1969).
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session, the proposals received no real consideration by either
house and died in committee or on the calendars of the respective
houses. Even in 1973, the proposal died in a Senate committee af-
ter having received considerable attention and having passed in
the House of Representatives.
Because of this legislative inaction, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal was called upon again in 1983 to decide the parameters of
an individual's right to die naturally.4 As framed by the court, the
issue in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth was
"one of life or death, or, more precisely, life without consciousness
as opposed to death with dignity: Under what circumstances may
artificial life sustaining procedures be terminated in the case of a
comatose, terminally ill patient."'5
In preface, the district court quoted extensively from the Florida
Supreme Court's affirmance of Perlmutter years earlier:
Because the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with com-
plexity and encompasses the interests of the law, both civil and
criminal, medical ethics and social morality, it is not one which is
well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial proceeding ...
Nevertheless, preference for legislative treatment cannot
shackle the courts when legally protected interests are at stake.'
The district court in JFK Memorial held that artificial life-sus-
taining procedures can be terminated lawfully. However, it cau-
tiously limited its holding to the case of a comatose patient who
previously has evidenced an intention not to have life-sustaining
procedures imposed, whose condition has been certified as terminal
by two physicians, and whose interests are protected by a court
appointed guardian.7 The district court then certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public
importance:
In the case of a comatose and terminally ill individual who has
executed a so-called "living" or "mercy" will, it is [sic] necessary
that a court appointed guardian of his person obtain the approval
of a court of competent jurisdiction before terminating extraordi-
nary life support systems in order for consenting family members,
4. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983),
rev'd, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) [hereinafter referred to as JFK Memorial].
5. JFK Memorial, 432 So. 2d at 613.
6. Id. at 618.
7. Id. at 619.
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the attending physicians, and the hospital and its administrators
to be relieved of civil and criminal liability.'
On May 17, 1984 the Florida Senate passed unanimously the
Life-Prolonging Procedure Act, which had already been approved
by the House of Representatives.' Then, on May 24, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled on the Fourth District Court's certified ques-
tion. In a liberal and far-reaching decision, the court held that rel-
atives of incompetent and terminally ill patients can halt ex-
traordinary medical treatment without first getting court
approval.10 Five days after the high court ruling, Florida Governor
Robert Graham signed into law the long-awaited Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act.11
This comment asserts that both the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal and the Florida Supreme Court misconstrued the issue
presented by JFK Memorial. Therefore, the facts of that case and
of the cases cited in support of the courts' respective holdings are
set out in detail. The issue presented was whether an individual's
written directive could be honored by health care providers once
that individual became comatose. The question apparently decided
was far broader-whether the substituted judgment doctrine could
be applied and life support systems terminated without either the
appointment of a guardian or judicial review of the decision. The
author's view is that the supreme court's conclusions are laudable,
but its analysis is unsound. The state of the law might be in confu-
sion were it not for the legislature's enactment of the Life-Prolong-
ing Procedure Act. Because of the Act's impact on natural death
issues, its provisions are reviewed and the Act is compared to stat-
utes of other jurisdictions. When appropriate, the Act's interrela-
tion with the JFK Memorial decision is noted.
8. Id. at 620.
9. FLA. S. JoUa. 319 (Reg. Sess. 1984). For the provisions of the Act, see the Life-Pro-
longing Procedure Act, ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Laws 136.
10. JFK Memorial, 452 So. 2d at 926. Although the decision was unanimous, Justices
McDonald and Shaw concurred in the result only. Justice McDonald authored a concurring
opinion.
11. Flaherty, Florida Court Endorses 'Living Will' Provisions, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1984,
at 4, col. 3. The article closes as follows:
The Bludworth case "catapulted [the Florida law] out of committee," said John R.
Day, a Shutts & Bowen partner who also represented Memorial Hospital. "After
ten years they finally passed the mercy will law." But the ... case still serves an
important purpose, said Mr. Meyers [another Shutts & Bowen partner] because it
takes the life-support decision out of the realm of "legislative grace."
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II. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth
In 1975, Francis B. Landy executed a "living will" 2 directing
that his life not be prolonged by artificial means and that he be
allowed to die with dignity and without pain if he should become
terminally ill. 13 On April 10, 1981, at the age of seventy-nine, Mr.
Landy was taken to the hospital. He was terminally ill and within
a few days lapsed into a coma. On April 12, Mr. Landy stopped
breathing and was placed on a mechanical ventilator in the inten-
sive care unit. A tube was placed down his throat and was attached
to a mechanical breathing apparatus. Nourishment was provided
to Mr. Landy through a tube placed in his nose. At the time he was
placed on the ventilator, Mr. Landy's heart was not functioning
properly, fluid was backed up in his lungs, and he had chronic in-
terstitial fibrosis and gastrointestinal bleeding in addition to re-
spiratory failure. As a result of his respiratory arrest, Mr. Landy
suffered permanent brain damage. He was unable to breathe for
himself and unable to think or respond. It became obvious over the
next few days that Mr. Landy would die if he were disconnected
from the respiratory machine. 4
Mr. Landy's doctor, board certified in internal medicine and in
pulmonary disease, diagnosed the condition as terminal on April
18th or 19th. A board-certified neurologist diagnosed Mr. Landy's
condition as permanent and terminal on April 20th.15 Beginning on
April 12th, Mrs. Landy urged her husband's treating physicians to
remove all artificial means of life support in accordance with her
husband's written directive. Fearing potential civil and criminal li-
ability, the hospital refused her pleas and instead filed an action
for declaratory relief.16
Mr. Landy died on April 24, 1981. Until his death, he continued
to be attached to the breathing machine. Mr. Landy's treating
physician wrote in the Death Summary, "It was [Mr. Landy's]
strong desire in the will that he depart his life in peaceful dignity,
12. A "living will" or "mercy will" is a document "executed by a person during his life-
time setting forth his wishes concerning medical treatment in contemplation of illness or
death." Note, In re Living Will, 5 NOVA L.J. 445, 445 n.1 (1981). Living wills have been in
circulation for years. See, e.g., Newsletter From Concern For Dying 2 (May 1980) (announc-
ing distribution of over four million copies of its version of a living will).
13. JFK Memorial, 452 So. 2d at 922.
14. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, JFK Memorial.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
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but as can be seen he was not allowed to do so.'
The hospital, joined by Mrs. Landy and the treating physician,
continued in its action for declaratory relief, maintaining that the
issue was not rendered moot by Mr. Landy's death because it was
likely to recur and again evade review.' 8 The circuit court agreed
and then held that in order to relieve the medical staff of criminal
or civil liability for the removal of extraordinary life support sys-
tems from a terminally ill patient, a guardian must be appointed
and a court order permitting termination of treatment obtained.
The Fourth District Court affirmed the trial court.19 In contrast
to the well-reasoned and sensitive Perlmutter opinion, the JFK
Memorial opinion is unreasoned. Although the court did recognize
Mr. Landy's constitutional right to refuse or discontinue extraordi-
nary medical treatment, it misapplied the privacy rights tests man-
dated by the United States Supreme Court, misconceptualized the
facts before it, and misconstrued case law from other jurisdictions.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the fundamen-
tal right of privacy as part of the penumbra of the Bill of Rights
guarantees. 0 In Perlmutter, the Fourth District Court reviewed a
line of cases from other jurisdictions and adopted the view that a
terminally ill individual has the right to refuse or discontinue
treatment based upon " 'the constitutional right to privacy . . . an
expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-deter-
mination.' ,,I1 Significantly, the Perlmutter court recognized that
17. Id. at 4 n.6.
18. JFK Memorial, 452 So. 2d at 614. Counsel stated that at the time of oral argument
in the trial court there were 40 comatose, terminally ill patients in JFK Memorial.
19. Id. at 620.
20. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Florida also has
recognized a right of privacy guaranteed by state law: "If there was any doubt ... that
Florida citizens enjoyed an explicit right of privacy it has been put to rest by the adoption
of Article I, Section 3, Florida Constitution (1980), entitled 'Right of Privacy.' " JFK Memo-
rial, 432 So. 2d at 618-19.
21. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980) (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 426 (Mass. 1977)). Because the majority of jurisdictions are deciding natural death
cases on constitutional right to privacy grounds, the common law right to bodily self-deter-
mination has become less significant in this context. But see In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64
(N.Y. 1981). In Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, the United States Supreme Court stated,
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891). Recognition of the individual's interest in preserving the "inviolability
of his person," Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905), aff'd, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906),
1984]
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the case before it did not involve the substituted judgment of a
guardian for an incompetent patient and stressed that its holding
was limited to the case of a competent adult patient. The court
recognized that the case of an incompetent terminal patient would
present more issues and refused to cross that "complex bridge" un-
til it was required to do S0.22
The crossing came with JFK Memorial. In first recognizing an
incompetent's right to refuse medical treatment, the court stepped
on solid ground, finding:
Every court that has considered a similar situation has con-
cluded that a terminally ill comatose patient, like his fully con-
scious and competent counterpart, has a right to refuse medical
treatment. Similarly, all agree that there must exist a correspond-
ing capability "to exercise that right; were this not so the right
would be an empty one, reduced to a meaningless 'form of words,'
illusory and devoid of substance.""
It was only in determining the manner by which the right may be
exercised that the Fourth District Court stepped unwittingly into a
quagmire.
To begin with, the district court's decision fails to reflect the re-
stricted scope within which a state may limit an individual's fun-
damental right of privacy in medical care. Although the state may
regulate the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, limiting
these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest,
and legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.24 Interference is impermissi-
ble if there exists a less restrictive alternative which would serve
the same basic purpose.25 Moreover, even where the required state
interests exist, state regulations may not have a significant impact
on a person's exercise of his constitutional right to privacy.26 Re-
quiring pretermination judicial review is overly restrictive where a
became known at common law as the right to bodily self-determination. From this right
developed the doctrine of informed consent, which recognized that every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
22. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162.
23. JFK Memorial, 432 So. 2d at 615 (quoting Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 544
(App. Div. 1980)).
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
25. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
26. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2481
(1983).
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comatose patient previously has executed a directive in exercise of
his constitutional rights; prolonging the individual's dying process
significantly impacts upon his exercise of his right to privacy.
In Perlmutter the Fourth District Court examined the interests
involved in the living death tragedies which have resulted from the
incredible advances in scientific medicine.2 7 Citing a leading Mas-
sachusetts case,28 the court identified four state interests that
counterbalance an individual's right to refuse treatment, namely:
1. The interest in the preservation of life.
2. The need to protect innocent third parties.
3. The duty to prevent suicide.
4. The requirement that the court help maintain the ethical
integrity of medical practice.29
The district court analyzed the facts before it and found that the
state's interest in preserving life was not compelling because "the
issue is not whether, but when, for how long and at what cost to
the individual [his] life may be briefly extended."' Also, the court
pointed out that Abe Perlmutter, at age seventy-three, would not
be "abandoning" minor children and that family members were all
in agreement with his wishes. Therefore, the state's interest in pro-
tection of third parties was not compelling."
Third, the court determined that the disconnection of Mr. Perl-
mutter's respirator would not be suicide because, should he die,
death would be the result of natural causes.2 Furthermore, distin-
guishing the familiar blood transfusion cases,33 the court concluded
that because Mr. Perlmutter did have a right to refuse treatment
in the first instance, he had a concomitant right to discontinue
27. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162.
28. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977).
29. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162 (citing Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425).
30. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162 (citing Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26).
31. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162. The protection of third parties by the state as parens
patriae is classically exemplified in In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), where the court ordered treatment
to prevent the patient from "abandoning" a minor child. One wonders whether this state
interest would be compelling in natural death cases where the patient does have a minor
child. Where death is imminent, abandonment is imminent and the state can only prolong
the suffering of all those involved.
32. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162.
33. "In the blood transfusion cases, the patient is either incompetent to make a medical
decision, equivocal about making it. . .or it is a family member making the decision for an
inert or minor third party patient." Id. at 163 (footnote omitted).
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treatment.3 4
As to the ethical integrity of medical practice, the court observed
that the prevailing practice is to recognize that the dying are more
often in need of comfort than treatment.3 5 The court stated that
"if the doctrines of informed consent and right of privacy have as
their foundations the right to bodily integrity . . . and control of
one's own fate, then those rights are superior to the institutional
considerations."3 The court concluded that when the state's inter-
ests are weighed against the rights of a terminally ill competent
individual, the latter must and should prevail.3 7
In JFK Memorial the Fourth District Court reaffirmed the con-
stitutional analysis in Perlmutter but found "significant distinc-
tions" between the case before it and the earlier case s.3 By tortu-
ous reasoning, the court determined that in Perlmutter the
individual himself was the direct beneficiary of the request to die
with dignity and the benefit was cessation of pain and suffering,
but in JFK Memorial the direct beneficiary of the request was the
family of the patient and the benefits were financial savings and
cessation of the emotional drain occasioned by awaiting the
medico-legal death of a loved one.3 9
The court's perceived distinction is illusory. On JFK Memorial's
facts, the patient himself is the direct beneficiary because his con-
stitutional right of privacy is vindicated. The benefit is the pa-
tient's ability to exercise his desire to die by natural causes and not
be subjected to a prolonged death which may denigrate his quality
of life. His family may be relieved of extended trauma and
overwhelming financial strain as a consequence of his choice, but
the benefit is no less the patient's if he chooses to spare his family.
The district court found that the perceived distinction between
Perlmutter and JFK Memorial required a change in focus from
safeguarding the interests of the state to protecting the interests of
the terminally ill comatose individual, reasoning: "One need not go
so far back in history as Cain and Abel to recognize that the inter-
ests of various family members are not always synonymous nor
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 163-64 (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 164.
38. JFK Memorial, 432 So. 2d at 618.
39. Id. The court assumed that a comatose individual suffers no pain. Based on the vol-
ume of testimony showing otherwise in natural death cases as well as on disagreement
within the medical community, it seems that pain of comatose individuals is beyond the
scope of judicial notice.
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even harmonious. 40
Apparently, the court ultimately determined that a procedure
including prior judicial review is a prerequisite to the termination
of life-prolonging treatment in the case of a comatose individual
because it misinterpreted cases from other jurisdictions. As framed
by the Fourth District, the JFK Memorial issue is synonymous
with the issue confronted by other jurisdictions, including New
Jersey, Delaware, Ohio, and Massachusetts.4 1 The court stated,
"One of the primary tasks confronting a court upon an application
for termination is to apply the so-called 'substituted judgment
rule' to determine from the known facts and circumstances what
the individual would want done if he were conscious and compe-
tent."'42 The court then referred to the variety of methods of deter-
mining intent used by other jurisdictions.
However, the facts of JFK Memorial did not raise an intent
question; therefore, substituted judgment was not an issue. Mr.
Landy had made his intent clear in his living will, executed at a
time when he was competent. Language in the cases relied on by
the Fourth District Court would lead to a finding that prior judi-
cial review is not required where substituted judgment is not in-
volved. A review of the cited cases is enlightening.
The general facts of In re Quinlan43 are well known. Karen
Quinlan fell comatose and was placed on a respirator. Her physi-
cians determined she would never return to a cognitive or sapient
life. Karen's father eventually petitioned the lower New Jersey
court for authority to order the respirator disconnected.44 The New
Jersey Supreme Court granted the authority to exercise Karen's
40. Id. The court went even further and contradicted itself by stating, "The newspaper
is a daily reminder that murderers are often related to their victims." Id. Previously, the
court acknowledged that death would occur, if at all, from natural causes. Murder requires
that the causal connection between the act (presumably disconnection of the support sys-
tems) and ensuing death be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
41. The court cited the following cases: Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d
1334 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan, 348
A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1980); Leach v.
Akron Gen. Medical Center, 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio C.P. 1980). The Fourth District appar-
ently was unaware that the lower appellate court Eichner decision was appealed to the New
York Court of Appeals and decided under another name. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.
1981).
42. JFK Memorial, 432 So. 2d at 619.
43. 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647
(N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
44. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651.
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privacy right to Karen's father as her guardian."
The court determined that the least intrusive and least burden-
some way of balancing individual against state interests was to al-
low Karen's family to use its best judgment as to whether Karen
would have exercised the right had she been competent. If the
family determined she would reject extraordinary life-sustaining
treatment, then upon both a determination by her physicians that
there was no reasonable possibility of Karen emerging from the
coma and a consultation with the hospital ethics committee, the
respirator could be removed."
Notably, the New Jersey court stated: "We consider that a prac-
tice of applying to a court to confirm such decisions would gener-
ally be inappropriate, not only because that would be a gratuitous
encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence,
but because it would be impossibly cumbersome.''47
Mr. Landy was seventy-three years old and had lived a full life;
Karen was twenty-one years old. Mr. Landy had executed a "living
will" expressly directing that his imminent death not be prolonged
by life-sustaining apparatus; Karen had not. The Fourth District
Court of Florida required judicial review prior to the exercise of
Mr. Landy's constitutional right; New Jersey does not require judi-
cial review even where substitute judgment is required.
In In re Storar, 4 Brother Joseph Fox had indicated orally that if
his prognosis were hopeless he would not want his life prolonged
by artificial means. At age eighty-three, he suffered a cardiac arrest
during surgery which resulted in severe and irreversible brain dam-
age. Brother Fox's superior instituted proceedings to have him de-
clared incompetent and to obtain judicial approval to withdraw the
respirator to which Brother Fox was connected. New York's lower
appellate court affirmed that part of the trial court's decision
which approved the removal of the respirator based on both the
common law right of bodily self-determination and a constitutional
privacy right. The lower appellate court then devised a legal
framework for the exercise of this right, holding that judicial ap-
proval was required in order to terminate extraordinary medical
treatment of a terminally ill and comatose patient.49
On appeal, New York's highest court, the New York Court of
45. Id. at 671.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 669.
48. 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
49. Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 550 (App. Div. 1980).
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Appeals, based its ruling on the common law right of bodily self-
determination and held that Brother Fox had the right to have the
apparatus removed. 0 Furthermore, the court found that Brother
Fox had made the decision to forego treatment for himself, based
on the oral statements he made prior to incompetency." Conse-
quently, the decision did not address the substituted judgment is-
sue. Moreover, the court of appeals modified the lower appellate
court's legal framework regulating the exercise of the right by "de-
leting everything but the authorization to the petitioner to discon-
tinue use of the respirator." 52
Therefore, under Storar, so long as there is even an oral expres-
sion of intent by a terminally ill patient prior to his incompetency,
that directive may be followed without judicial intervention. Mr.
Landy had not only expressed his intent orally, but had memorial-
ized his directive in a living will.
The development of natural death case law in Massachusetts has
been more confusing than in other states. Superintendent oj
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz 53 involved a sixty-seven-
year-old man suffering from acute myeloblastic monocytic leuke-
mia. With a mental age of approximately three years, Saikewicz
had lived in state institutions for over fifty years. The superinten-
dent, along with a staff attorney at Belchertown, filed a motion for
the appointment of a guardian ad litem with authority to make the
necessary decisions concerning Saikewicz's care and treatment.
The appointed guardian ad litem filed a report with the court rec-
ommending that the medically indicated treatment, chemotherapy,
not be given. After a hearing, the probate court entered an order
essentially agreeing with the guardian's recommendation and re-
porting two questions that were allowed direct appellate review by
the supreme judicial court. The first question addressed the pro-
bate court's authority to order withholding of medical treatment
and the second asked if the probate court was correct in ordering
that no treatment be administered in Saikewicz's case.5 The su-
preme judicial court answered both questions in the affirmative
and stated:
[W]e now reiterate the substituted judgment doctrine as we apply
50. Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 74.
51. Id. at 72.
52. Id. at 74.
53. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
54. Id. at 419 & n.2.
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it in the instant case. We believe that both the guardian ad litem
in his recommendation and the judge in his decision should have
attempted (as they did) to ascertain the incompetent person's ac-
tual interests and preferences. In short, the decision in cases such
as this should be that which would be made by this incompetent
person, if that person were competent, but taking into account
the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of
the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-mak-
ing process of the competent person.55
Although the Saikewicz decision did require judicial interven-
tion, that case can be distinguished from JFK Memorial. Mr.
Landy was competent when he executed his living will; Mr.
Saikewicz was severely mentally retarded and never had expressed
an intent that he not be subjected to extraordinary medical treat-
ment. Mr. Landy had the support of family members. Mr.
Saikewicz was a ward of the state and had no family willing to
become involved.5 6 The interests in the two cases are clearly di-
verse. It is also pertinent to note that the Saikewicz decision has
been criticized in both the legal and medical communities and has
caused much confusion in Massachusetts. 7
A lower Massachusetts appellate court following on the footsteps
of Saikewicz tried to narrow and contain its impact in In re Din-
nerstein.5 s First, the court interpreted Saikewicz to require judicial
approval only where life-saving or life-prolonging treatment is to
be withheld as opposed to administered.59 Second, the court stated:
As it cannot be assumed that legal proceedings such as the pre-
sent one will be initiated in respect of more than a small fraction
of all terminally ill or dying elderly patients, the Saikewicz case,
if read to apply to the natural death of a terminally ill patient by
cardiac or respiratory arrest, would require attempts to resusci-
tate dying patients in most cases, without exercise of medical
55. Id. at 431.
56. Two of his sisters, the only family members that could be located, "preferred not to
attend" the hearing or otherwise become involved. Id. at 420.
57. See, e.g., Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Ter-
minally Ill Incompetent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367 (1979); Dunn, Who Pulls the Plug: The
Practical Effect of the Saikewicz Decision, MEDICOLEGAL NEWS, Winter 1978, at 7; Glantz,
Post-Saikewicz Judicial Actions Clarify the Rights of Patients and Families, MEDICOLEGAL
NEWS, Winter 1978, at 9; Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: Judges As Physicians, 298 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 508 (1978); Ufford, Brain Death/Termination of Heroic Efforts To Save
Life- Who Decides?, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 225, 254 (1980).
58. 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
59. Id. at 137.
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judgment, even when that course of action could aptly be charac-
terized as a pointless, even cruel, prolongation of the act of
dying."
Third, the court concluded that the life-prolonging treatments re-
quired by Saikewicz are meant to be, at the very least, treatments
administered with some reasonable expectation of effecting a re-
mission of symptoms enabling a return toward a normal function-
ing, integrated existence.6
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court approved the Din-
nerstein result in In re Spring.6 2 Earle Spring, seventy-nine, was
suffering from end-stage kidney disease, which required him to un-
dergo hemodialysis treatment three days a week, five hours a day.
He also suffered from senility and was completely confused and
disoriented. Without the dialysis treatment, Earle would die; with
it, he might survive for months.
In the petition of his wife and son, who was his temporary
guardian, a probate court found that Spring would, if competent,
choose not to receive treatment and ordered that Spring's attend-
ing physician, wife, and son together decide whether to terminate
treatment. The appeals court affirmed the judgment, but the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court concluded it was error to delegate the
decision to the attending physician and Spring's wife and son. 3
Nevertheless, the court pointed out that neither Saikewicz nor
Spring "presented any issue as to the legal consequences of action
taken without court approval."'e4 It went on to caution that its
''opinions should not be taken to establish any requirement of
60. Id.
61. Id. at 137-38.
62. 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980).
63. The court stated, "[W]e disapprove shifting of the ultimate decision-making respon-
sibility away from the duly established courts of proper jurisdiction." Id. at 120.
64. Id. at 119. Initially the court seemed to limit its discussion to action taken in cases of
"brain death." In brain death, the entire brain, including the cerebral cortex, which is re-
sponsible for cognition, and the brain stem, which is responsible for reflex or automatic
control of vital involuntary bodily functions, has ceased to function. See FLA. STAT. §
382.085 (1983). However, the court eventually incorporated irreversible vegetative coma into
its discussion by acknowledging and approving the holding of Dinnerstein. For a persistent
vegetative coma, only extensive injury to the upper portion of the brain need occur. So,
although the brain is incapable of cognitive function, there may be persistence or return of
brain waves, cephalic reflexes, and spontaneous breathing because some brain regions are
not damaged. Patients in a vegetative state may move, groan, blink, and react to light and
sound. Greenbaum, Current Standards of Practice in Medicine: The Medical, Judicial and
Legislative Roles, 7 W. ST. U.L. REV. 3, 14 (1979).
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prior judicial approval that would not otherwise exist.""6
The court then listed the following circumstances that should be
taken into account in deciding whether there should be an applica-
tion for a prior court order with respect to medical treatment of an
incompetent patient:
The extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties,
whether the patient is in the custody of a State institution, the
prognosis without the proposed treatment, the prognosis with the
proposed treatment, the complexity, risk and novelty of the pro-
posed treatment, its possible side effects, the patient's level of un-
derstanding and probable reaction, the urgency of the decision,
the consent of the patient, spouse or guardian, the good faith of
those who participate in the decision, the clarity of professional
opinion as to what is good medical practice, the interests of third
persons, and the administrative requirements of any institutions
involved."6
The facts of the Spring case did not compel the court to decide
what combination of circumstances would make prior court ap-
proval necessary. That decision was left to be made upon the par-
ticular facts of future cases.
In Custody of a Minor,"7 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court tried to clarify the Saikewicz-Dinnerstein-Spring trilogy. In
that case, a baby with terminal heart disease had been abandoned
by his family and was under the supervision of a public welfare
agency. The hospital sought to "no code" the child's medical chart.
A "no code" order directs hospital staff not to apply extraordinary
resuscitative measures in the event of cardiac or respiratory
failure.6 8
65. In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d at 120. The court's discussion regarding the need for a court
order, particularly its comment on the scarcity of precedent addressing criminal liability and
the more fully developed law governing civil liability for health care providers acting with-
out judicial approval, is enlightening.
66. Id. at 121.
67. 434 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. 1982).
68. Id. The terms "no-code" or "DNR" (do not resuscitate) derive from a hospital prac-
tice utilizing teams of nurses and physicians trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR). When a patient goes into cardiac or respiratory arrest, a code word and room num-
ber are sounded, signaling the team of the emergency. When a no-code order is given, the
team is not alerted. The no-code order conforms with current medical standards. "Basic life
support is not indicated for a victim who is known to be in the terminal stages of an incur-
able condition." Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Car-
diac Care (ECC), 227 J. A.M.A. 837, 864 (1974). The "partial" or "slow-code," responding to
a code slowly or not using every available lifesaving measure, is more controversial. See
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The supreme judicial court noted that Dinnerstein permits a
"no code" without prior judicial approval and that Spring ap-
proved Dinnerstein as consistent with Saikewicz. The court distin-
guished Dinnerstein and Saikewicz based on state custody and the
prognosis without treatment versus the prognosis with the pro-
posed treatment. 9 The court compared Dinnerstein and Saikewicz
as raising the same issue of "whether and by what means a person
has the right to refuse the invasion of his or her bodily integrity by
refusing extraordinary medical treatment."'70
The court then applied the Spring analysis and determined that
a prior court order was necessary in Custody of a Minor.7 The
court reasoned, "Absent a loving family with whom physicians may
consult regarding the entry of a 'no code' order, the issue is best
resolved by requiring a judicial determination in accordance with
the substituted judgment doctrine enumerated in Saikewicz. "72
Ultimately, the state of the law in Massachusetts regarding sub-
stituted judgment appears to be that if the incompetent's intent is
not known but there is a loving family familiar with his character
and beliefs, then the family, in consultation with the physicians,
can exercise the patient's right of privacy without prior judicial ap-
proval. Again, it is crucial to note that JFK Memorial did not in-
volve the special considerations present where substituted judg-
ment is exercised.
The Supreme Court of Delaware decided the procedural issue of
an incompetent's right to have life-prolonging treatment discontin-
ued upon certification from the Court of Chancery in Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Center.73 Mary Reeser Severns, aged fifty-
five, sustained serious brain injury in a car accident. For all practi-
cal purposes, she had been in a coma since the accident. Mrs. Sev-
ern's husband filed for an order appointing him guardian of her
person. He asked for authorization to discontinue the use of the
respirator, tracheotomy, and drugs and to have a "no code" order
entered.7 1
The Delaware court held that although enabling legislation was
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVORIAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 250-51 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
69. Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d at 607.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 608.
72. Id.
73. 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
74. Id. at 1336-39.
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not essential to recognition of Mrs. Severn's constitutional right,
an evidentiary hearing was a prerequisite to relief.75 The court
explained:
We are sensitive to the need for a prompt adjudication of the is-
sues presented in the lawsuit and of the additional grief which
uncertainty may bring to the Severns family. But we cannot un-
dertake to rule on these life-and-death matters-which are of
transcendent importance to all of us-on the basis of a stipula-
tion of facts. The problems are too large, the precedent too signif-
icant and the stipulation is too vague. 76
Mrs. Leach had not executed a living will. Thus, the circumstances
of that case are significantly different from those of JFK
Memorial.
The Probate Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio,
faced with the case of an incompetent who had not executed a liv-
ing will, also determined that judicial review was a prerequisite to
relief. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center" involved a sev-
enty-three-year-old woman suffering from amyotrophic lateral scle-
rosis. Her treating physician informed her of the disease and told
her it would be terminal within three to five years. Mrs. Leach's
health deteriorated as expected and she eventually was admitted
to the hospital in a stuperous condition. After some improvement,
she suffered a cardiac arrest. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was
administered and her heartbeat was restored.75 She then was
placed on a life support system consisting of a respirator, nasogas-
tric tube, and catheter. After four months of observing his wife's
chronic vegetative condition, Mrs. Leach's husband asked the
treating physician to terminate use of the respirator. The physician
refused to do so without court order and so the familiar judicial
process began.79
75. Id. at 1349.
76. Id. (footnote omitted).
77. 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio C.P. 1980).
78. Id. at 810. In many instances, terminally ill patients are subjected to CPR where the
treating physician has failed to chart a no-code or DNR order. See supra note 68. When the
patient goes into cardiac or respiratory arrest and the treating physician is not immediately
available, a nurse or a physician unfamiliar with the patient's history is likely to administer
CPR.
79. Leach, 426 N.E.2d at 811. The Ohio Court of Common Pleas pointed out that Mrs.
Leach was being kept alive at a cost of approximately $500 per day. Indeed, judicial review
is costly in terms of both time and expense. The Brother Fox case (In re Storar) continued
long past the patient's death. His medical care during the legal battle cost $87,000 and the
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At the evidentiary hearing, a total of seventeen witnesses testi-
fied."o In numerous conversations with family and friends, Mrs.
Leach had expressed her desire not to be placed on a life support
system. Only two days prior to her hospitalization, she had told a
friend: "That's the one thing that terrifies me. I don't want to be
put on life support systems. I don't want to live if I have to be a
vegetable."8' Thus in Leach, as in Storar, the incompetent had ex-
pressed orally the specific desire to forego life-prolonging treat-
ment and therefore there was no written directive to evidence this
intent. But in JFK Memorial Mr. Landy had made his intent clear
by executing a living will.
In sum, the Fourth District Court rightly looked to the above
mentioned cases in determining that an individual, competent or
incompetent, has the right to forego life-sustaining treatment.
However, the court erred in relying on those cases in deciding to
require judicial review prior to termination of treatment. Conspic-
uous in all the cited decisions is the absence of a directive executed
by the patient while he was competent.
Given the facts of JFK Memorial and the obvious flaws in the
Fourth District Court of Appeal's analysis, the Florida Supreme
Court could have handed down a narrow, conservative decision on
the "right to die." The supreme court might have held, for exam-
ple, that doctors and hospitals do not need court permission to
honor an incompetent patient's written directive so long as a requi-
site number of qualified physicians had certified that the patient's
condition was terminal.
Instead, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that, even in the ab-
sence of a living will, doctors may withhold medical treatment of a
comatose patient at the request of the family or a legal guardian
without court permission so long as at least two physicians other
than the treating physician agree that there is no reasonable medi-
cal expectation that the patient will recover.8 2
Writing for the court, Chief Justice James Alderman first con-
cluded that an individual, competent or incompetent, has the con-
stitutional right to privacy and freedom of choice to terminate his
life-sustaining treatment.8 3 The court stated that terminally ill pa-
legal costs before his death were $20,000. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 159
n. 114.
80. Leach, 426 N.E.2d at 811.
81. Id.
82. JFK Memorial, 452 So. 2d at 926.
83. Id. at 924.
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tients' constitutional rights should not be lost when they suffer ir-
reversible brain damage, become comatose, and are no longer able
to express their wishes to discontinue the use of extraordinary life
support systems. 4 Further, the court found applicable to-the facts
before it the Perlmutter principle that the state's interest against
termination of extraordinary life support weakens and the individ-
ual's right to privacy increases as the bodily invasion becomes
greater and the prognosis dims.8 5 "The issue in these cases is not
whether a life should be saved. Rather, it is how long and at what
cost the dying process should be prolonged." '
Having recognized the right to discontinue treatment, the court
went on to analyze the means by which the right may be exercised.
As had the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the supreme court er-
roneously found the substitute judgment doctrine applicable to
JFK Memorial. The high court acknowledged the district court's
discussion of decisions from other jurisdictions and specifically ad-
dressed Quinlan, as well as two cases not discussed in the district
court's opinion. 7 One of the two, In re Colyer,88 is a Washington
Supreme Court case. The other, In re Guardianship of Barry,89 is
out of Florida's Second District Cour't of Appeal.
Colyer involved a sixty-nine-year-old woman who had been with-
out oxygen for approximately ten minutes as a result of a cardio-
pulmonary arrest. The hospital was keeping her alive by artificial
support mechanisms, but she had suffered massive brain damage,
required a respirator to breathe, and remained in a persistent vege-
tative state. Two physicians agreed that the most optimistic prog-
nosis was that she might be able to breathe on her own, but would
persist in an infantile state, unable to speak or communicate and
requiring maintenance of all bodily functions."
Mrs. Colyer's husband was appointed guardian over her person
and estate. He petitioned the Washington Superior Court to au-
thorize removal of the life support systems. A guardian ad litem
was appointed to represent Mrs. Colyer's interests. After an evi-
dentiary hearing, the judge ordered the support systems with-




87. Id. at 925-26.
88. 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
89. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
90. Colyer, 660 P.2d at 740.
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Washington Supreme Court."'
The Washington Supreme Court heard oral argument and af-
firmed the trial court's order. Mrs. Colyer died peacefully soon af-
ter the support system was removed, and eventually the court pub-
lished its opinion on the natural death issue.2 That opinion
specifically noted that the state's natural death act did not govern
the case before it because the act speaks to the situation where a
directive has been signed, and Mrs. Colyer had not signed a direc-
tive. 3 Faced, therefore, with the question of who may exercise an
incompetent's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment where no di-
rective exists, the supreme court held that, as a general principle, a
decision to terminate life sustaining treatment in the circum-
stances presented by Colyer does not require judicial interven-
tion.94 Specifically, the court stated: "In cases where physicians
agree on the prognosis and a close family member uses his best
judgment as a guardian to exercise the rights of the incompetent,
intervention by the courts would be little more than a formality. '95
Again, the point must be made that JFK Memorial did not in-
volve substituted judgment. Mr. Landy had signed a directive, wit-
nessed by two people. Had he been under Washington's jurisdic-
tion, his case would have been governed by that state's natural
death act and the directive would have been effectuated in good
faith, with no civil or criminal liability attaching.9 6
Barry was a model case of substituted judgment. Andrew James
Barry was only ten months old. Since birth he had been in a vege-
tative state, supported by a ventilator system. Eventually his natu-
ral parents were appointed as legal guardians and they petitioned
for approval to terminate the life support system. The court ap-
pointed a guardian ad litem, who recommended the parents' peti-
tion be granted. The state attorney, however, sought to have the
petition dismissed.9 7
At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing the trial court took
the matter under advisement. Three days later that court entered
an order authorizing the parents to have the system withdrawn
and to instruct the attending physicians not to furnish life-sus-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 741. See also infra note 111.
94. Colyer, 660 P.2d at 744.
95. Id. at 746.
96. Id. at 741.
97. Barry, 445 So. 2d at 368.
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taining procedures thereafter, except for the limited purposes of
alleviating the child's pain and suffering, keeping him comfortable,
and providing normal nutrition. 8
The trial court's holding was based on detailed findings of fact
that the child was terminally ill and could not reasonably be ex-
pected to live much beyond two years even if the life support sys-
tem was retained.9 9 A neonatologist had testified that, in layman's
terms, Andrew had a hole where a large part of the brain would
normally have been, and that the child's condition was incurable
and irreversible. Another neonatologist as well as a child neurolo-
gist had concurred in that diagnosis and prognosis. 00
The state appealed and the trial judge's order was stayed pend-
ing resolution by the Second District Court of Appeal. The district
court specifically recognized that Barry addressed the removal of
life support systems from a minor and therefore was not controlled
by legal precedent allowing a competent individual to order re-
moval of life support systems."'0 Notably, the court cited the Perl-
mutter and JFK Memorial district court opinions.102 The Second
District concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence to
support the trial judge's findings, that Andrew's interests out-
weighed those of the state, and that his parents could assert a pri-
vacy interest on his behalf. The court furthermore found that the
trial court had applied correctly the doctrine of substituted
judgment.10 3
Addressing the procedural issue, the court held: "A decision by
parents supported by competent medical advice that their young
child suffers from a permanent, incurable and irreversible physical
or mental defect likely to soon result in the child's death should
ordinarily be sufficient without court approval."104 Nevertheless,
courts must be open to hear natural death matters when judicial
intervention is solicited by the family, guardian, affected medical
personnel, or the state."0 5
In JFK Memorial, the supreme court agreed with the analysis of
Quinlan, Colyer, and Barry, each holding that as a general rule,
98. Id. at 369.
99. Id. at 368.
100. Id. at 368, 370.
101. Id. at 369.
102. Id. at 370 & n.3.
103. Id. at 371.
104. Id. at 372. The issues raised and lines drawn where the patient is an infant are
especially perplexing. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 197-229.
105. Barry, 445 So. 2d at 372.
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natural death decisions are to be made without judicial interven-
tion and within the patient-doctor-family relationship. However,
the court rejected Quinlan's requirement that a hospital's ethics
committee concur in the decision and Colyer's implicit require-
ment that a guardian be appointed in all cases.'0 6
The court held that the right of a patient in an irreversibly co-
matose and essentially vegetative state to refuse extraordinary life-
sustaining measures may be exercised by his family or by a guard-
ian. If there are close family members willing to exercise the right
on behalf of the patient, a guardian of the person need not be judi-
cially appointed. As illustrated by the court, "close family mem-
bers" encompasses the patient's spouse, adult children, or
parents."'
Finally addressing the certified question before it, the court re-
lied upon the substituted judgment doctrine and stated:
Under this doctrine close family members or legal guardians sub-
stitute their judgment for what they believe the terminally ill in-
competent persons, if competent, would have done under these
circumstances. If such a person, while competent, had executed a
so-called "living" or "mercy" will, that will would be persuasive
evidence of that incompetent person's intention and it should be
given great weight by the person or persons who substitute their
judgment on behalf of the terminally ill incompetent.' 0
Under the supreme court's holding, guardians, consenting family
members, physicians, hospitals, or their administrators need only
act in good faith to avoid potential liability.'0 9
Justice McDonald wrote a concurring opinion in which he ap-
peared to acknowledge that JFK Memorial did not involve substi-
tuted judgment. His concern was that although the certified ques-
tion should have been answered in the negative, the court should
not have suggested answers to factual questions which were not
before it. He also indicated that had the case involved substituted
judgment, he would have required that a guardian be appointed to
106. JFK Memorial, 452 So. 2d at 926.
107. Id.
108. Id. Some jurisdictions define the substituted judgment doctrine as involving the
court's determination of what treatment the incompetent would have chosen, based on the
evidence presented. See, e.g., Colyer, 660 P.2d at 745 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)).
109. JFK Memorial, 452 So. 2d at 926. For them to be held civilly or criminally liable,
there must be a showing that their actions were intended to harm the patient.
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act for the incompetent."'
On the one hand, the supreme court holding goes too far by al-
lowing family members to substitute their judgment for the pa-
tient's without requiring the appointment of a guardian. Requiring
a guardian in such cases would provide adequate safeguards for the
incompetent without overly restricting the exercise of his constitu-
tional privacy rights. Moreover, the court invited further contro-
versy by inadequately describing who is a "family member" for
purposes of the rule and by failing to set out a priority among
those members.
On the other hand, the supreme court takes a step backwards in
the protection of an individual's personal choice to forego life-sus-
taining treatment. An individual who asserts his constitutional
right by memorializing his intent in a living will while competent
has no assurance his constitutional right will be exercised should
he fall into a coma. At that point, the right is handed over to close
relatives or guardians. The individual's living will, a clear and defi-
nite expression of his intent to exercise his right to forego treat-
ment, disintegrates into only persuasive evidence of his intent. The
living will should be conclusive evidence of the patient's intent.
III. FLORIDA'S LIFE-PROLONGING PROCEDURE ACT
The Florida legislature may have eliminated the confusion cre-
ated by the supreme court in JFK Memorial by enacting the Life-
Prolonging Procedure Act. The Act clearly sets out the procedure
for making declarations instructing physicians to provide, with-
hold, or withdraw life-prolonging treatment"' or for designating a
110. Id. at 927 (McDonald, J., concurring).
111. Ch. 84-58, § 4, 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 137, sets forth the procedure for making a decla-
ration (alternatively referred to as a directive or living will in other jurisdictions) as well as
the procedure for providing notice to the physician and incorporation of the declaration into
the drafter's medical records:
(1) Any competent adult may, at any time, make a written declaration directing
the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures in the event such per-
son should have a terminal condition. A written declaration shall be signed by the
declarant in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, one of whom shall be
neither a spouse nor blood relative of the declarant. If the declarant is physically
unable to sign the written declaration, his declaration may be given orally, in
which event one of the witnesses shall subscribe the declarant's signature in the
declarant's presence and by his direction.
(2) It shall be the responsibility of the declarant to provide for notification to
his attending physician that a declaration has been made. In the event the declar-
ant is comatose, incompetent, or otherwise mentally or physically incapable, any
other person may notify the physician of the existence of a declaration. An attend-
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substitute to make the treatment decision.112 Generally, the Act as-
sures that an individual's written directive will be followed without
judicial intervention if it meets statutory guidelines. Therefore, it
would seem that having a "living will" may become as common
and legally advisable as having a will passing property at death.
Furthermore, the Act clearly distinguishes between situations
where an individual himself makes the choice to terminate treat-
ment and those where another specified individual is permitted to
make that choice for an incompetent.1 3
Apparently, passage of the Act was a major political accomplish-
ment in Florida.11 4 In this state and others, there have been four
primary reasons that legal recognition of the right to die naturally
has been opposed: (1) organized religion is opposed to euthanasia;
(2) the medical profession traditionally has deplored euthanasia;
(3) recognition could open the door to mass euthanasia; and (4)
there is a possibility of incorrect diagnosis or that new medical dis-
covery would have cured a patient who chose euthanasia.115 An ex-
amination of recent opinions voiced by religious leaders, doctors,
ing physician who is so notified shall promptly make the declaration or a copy of
the declaration, if written, a part of the declarant's medical records. If the declara-
tion is oral, the physician shall likewise promptly make the fact of such declara-
tion a part of the patient's medical record.
Section 5 furthermore sets forth a suggested, but explicitly not required, declaration form.
Other jurisdictions, including California, Idaho, Oregon, and Texas, do not allow the form
of the declaration to be varied from the statutory form. Nevada requires that the declara-
tion be "substantially" the form given in the statute. See infra note 123.
112. Ch. 84-58, §§ 5, 7(1)(b), 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 137-38, 139; see also id. § 2, 1984 Fla.
Laws at 136.
113. When there has been no declaration, the Act requires consultation and written
agreement between the attending physician and any one of the following individuals in the
following order of priority: the judicially appointed guardian, but only if one has been ap-
pointed; the person designated by the patient in writing to make the treatment decision; the
patient's spouse; an adult child or, if the patient has more than one adult child, by a major-
ity of the adult children who are reasonably available for consultation; the parents; or the
nearest living relation. Id. § 7, 1984 Fla. Laws at 139. The Act defines and establishes a
priority among the "close family members" whom the JFK Memorial decision would permit
to substitute their judgment for that of their incompetent relative. Id.
For a discussion of considerations involved in resolving possible conflicts between various
persons authorized to consent for another, see Simpson & Armbrust, A Critical Analysis of
the Arkansas Death With Dignity Act, 1 U. ARK. LIT-ME ROCK L.J. 473 (1978). Arkansas is
unique in permitting one person to execute a declaration for another. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-
3803 (Supp. 1983). Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-35-4 (1978) (allowing for execution of a decla-
ration for a terminally ill minor, but only through a court procedure).
The Florida statute does not allow a person to execute a dec'aration for another but
rather codifies the substitute judgment doctrine in § 7.
114. See Palm Beach Post, May 18, 1984, at A16, col. 1.
115. Ufford, supra note 57, at 240-42 (citing Moore, The Case for Voluntary Euthana-
sia, 42 U. Mo. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 327 (1974)).
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and lawyers suggests that these arguments against right to die leg-
islation may not be valid.
In Florida, the strongest opposition to previous efforts to pass
natural death legislation came from the Roman Catholic Church.11
Yet, curiously enough, the concepts of brain death and voluntary
passive euthanasia do not violate the espoused principles of major
Protestant religions, orthodox Judaism, and the Catholic
Church.1 17 For example, in 1980 the Sacred Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith set forth the Catholic Church's teaching on
euthanasia:
Life is a gift of God, and on the other hand death is unavoidable;
it is necessary therefore that we, without any way hastening the
hour of death, should be able to accept it with full responsibility
and dignity. It is true that death marks the end of our earthly
existence, but at the same time it opens the door to immortal life.
Therefore all must prepare themselves for this event in the light
of human values, and Christians even more so in the light of
faith.
As to those who work in the medical profession, they ought to
neglect no means of making all their skill available to the sick and
the dying; but they should also remember how much more neces-
sary it is to provide them with the comfort of boundless kindness
and heartfelt charity." s
Additionally, the medical profession has practiced and explicitly
endorses passive euthanasia. Although health care providers in-
creasingly have sought judicial review of decisions to forego life-
sustaining treatment, the impetus has been legal responsibility, not
medical ethics.' 9 Some are prompted by a professional disagree-
ment with or conflict among the patient's relatives. More often,
though, the physician is comfortable with the decision but fears
criminal or civil liability.2
116. Palm Beach Post, May 18, 1984, at A16, col. 1.
117. Ufford, supra note 57, at 240.
118. SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHANA-
SIA FROM ROME (May 5, 1980); see also Pope Pius XII, Prolongation of Life, 4 AM. Q. PAPAL
DOCTRINE 393 (1958); Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative
Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202, 1209 (1973).
119. See Medical Ethics: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) (testimony before the sub-
committee revealed approximately three-fourths of all physicians regularly practiced passive
euthanasia); OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 9-10
(1982).
120. Although criminal actions are rare, criminal liability is a serious threat. See gener-
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In answer to the third contention, Luis Kutner, Chief Justice of
the World Court of Human Rights, stated:
That legalized voluntary euthanasia might soon lead to involun-
tary euthanasia ignores the main difference between the two: in-
formed consent-a greater difference than exists between active
or passive euthanasia (act vis-a-vis omission). So, the legal defini-
tion of euthanasia could be limited to include only those terminal
patients who gave their informed consent, thus preventing mercy
killing of any non-consenting terminal patients. '2
The fourth argument against natural death legislation is the
most persuasive, for always there is some hope of a miracle, some
possibility, however remote, that tomorrow's medical breakthrough
will provide a cure. The response to this argument is simply this:
"We stand in awe of the life preserving power of modern technol-
ogy; yet we also fear that we may be losing control of the techno-
logical monsters we have created."' 22 Adoption of the fourth argu-
ment requires society to demand that the individual surrender his
dignity to technology on the tenuous proposition that a cure might
be found.
Although the Florida legislature recently determined that the
above arguments were not persuasive enough to block natural
death legislation, language in the Act makes it clear the drafters
were sensitive to opposition. Given the experience of fifteen state
"laboratories" where natural death laws already had been enacted,
Florida was well-equipped to draft provisions to reflect the inter-
ests of all concerned. 123
Noticeably, the Florida statute is carefully drawn to avoid the
problems generated by other states' statutes. Specifically, the stat-
ally Reaves, Cutting Off the IV, 70 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1984, at 31.
121. Kutner, Euthanasia: Due Process for Death With Dignity; The Living Will, 54 IND.
L.J. 201, 221 (1979).
122. Winslade, Bioethics-California's Natural Death Act: What Every Attorney
Should Know, 1 L.A. LAW., Mar. 1978, at 16.
123. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804
(1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§
2501-2509 (1982); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2401 to -2430 (1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to
-4508 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.550-
.590 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322
(1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050-.090 (1983); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 459 (Vernon
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1801 and tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1982); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1
to .8:13 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (1979). For a thorough,
enlightening survey of natural death legislation, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 68,
at apps. D, E.
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ute does not operate to exclude common law and constitutional
rights held by individuals who have not executed a declaration. 24
On the other hand, section 11 states that nothing in the Act shall
be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing or eu-
thanasia, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission
to end life other than by natural process.'25
Generally, terms used in the Act have been defined so as to
avoid ambiguity and consequent generation of questions of fact.'2"
However, the legislature failed to learn from the California experi-
ence that defining "terminal condition" as a condition where death
is "imminent" is unsatisfactory. 27 As California has found, the ef-
fective legal definition of "imminent" conflicts with medical stan-
dards. A definition specifying a time frame in which death is ex-
pected to occur may have been less controversial.
Other than the use of the ambigious term "imminent," Florida
has profited from the experience of other jurisdictions and has de-
fined clearly the terms contained in the Act. Under the Florida
statute, a terminal condition means "a condition caused by injury,
disease, or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, there can be no recovery and death is imminent.' ' 2 ' Ex-
cept for the word "imminent," this definition is clear and under-
standable. Moreover, "life-prolonging procedure" is painstakingly
defined to include any medical procedure, treatment, or interven-
tion that utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain,
restore, or supplant a spontaneous vital function and would serve
only to prolong the dying process of a terminally ill patient. 2 '
The Act specifically excludes from the definition of life-prolong-
ing procedure the provision of sustenance or the administration of
medication or performance of any medical procedure deemed nec-
essary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain. 130 The executive
director of the Florida Catholic Conference opined that this provi-
sion avoids abuses inherent in legislation adopted in other states
and referred to a recent California case, presumably that of Eliza-
124. Ch. 84-58, § 13, 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 140-41.
125. Id. § 11, 1984 Fla. Laws at 140.
126. Id. § 3, 1984 Fla. Laws at 136-37.
127. Id. § 3(6), 1984 Fla. Laws at 137; Winslade, supra note 122, at 38; see, e.g., PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 24-26; Comment, The California Natural Death Act:
An Empirical Study of Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 933 (1979).
128. Ch. 84-58, § 3(6), 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 137.
129. Id. § 3(3).
130. Id.
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beth Bouvia."' However, an individual such as Miss Bouvia, per-
manently disabled but otherwise healthy, would not be allowed to
refuse nourishment under the Florida Act even absent the suste-
nance provision because the condition must be terminal.1 32
The California act requires the attending physician to determine
the validity of the directive.1 33 Likewise, the act delegates judicial
responsibility to the physician in the case where the declarant be-
comes a qualified patient after executing a directive and has not
subsequently reexecuted a directive.1 34 The physician is made to
act as the trier of fact.
Under the Florida Act the attending physician is not required to
determine the declaration's validity. Furthermore, under Florida
law, only when the declaration is oral must it be made subsequent
to the time the terminal condition is diagnosed.1 35 A written decla-
ration may be made by any competent adult at any time and re-
tains its validity until it is revoked. 31 The Florida approach is
preferable because it relieves physicians of unnecessary adminis-
trative burdens.
Several statutes subject a person who falsifies or forges the dec-
laration of another or who willfully conceals or withholds personal
knowledge of revocation to prosecution for unlawful homicide. 13
By treating the declaration as any other legal paper or document
for purposes of forgery penalties, the Florida legislature avoided
the contradiction of declaring on the one hand that termination of
treatment is not the cause of death and on the other hand that
forging the document that permitted termination of treatment is
homicide.'
Several statutes specify that a directive is nullified by preg-
nancy.13 9 The Florida legislature apparently bowed to the Florida
Catholic Conference in providing that the declaration of a qualified
131. Palm Beach Post, May 18, 1984, at A16, col. 1.
132. Ch. 84-58, § 3(6), 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 137.
133. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(a) (West 1984).
134. Id. § 7191(c). See generally Comment, supra note 127 (discussing physician's
responsibility).
135. Ch. 84-58, § 3, 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 136-37.
136. Id. § 4(1), 1984 Fla. Laws at 137. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 68, at
310-11, for a comparison of complicated and complicating restrictions set by other
jurisdictions.
137. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7194 (West 1984); TEx. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 9 (Vernon 1984); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.090 (1984).
138. Ch. 84-58, § 10, 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 140. See FLA. STAT. § 831.01 (1983).
139. See, e.g., legislation in Alabama, California, Delaware, Kansas, Nevada, Texas, and
Washington listed supra note 123; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 310-11.
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patient or the written agreement made in accordance with the sub-
stituted judgment provision has no effect during the course of a
pregnancy.140 In light of Roe v. Wade,"" this provision may be un-
constitutional. Under Roe and subsequent cases, a woman has un-
fettered discretion in determining whether to abort during the first
trimester of her pregnancy. The Act works as an automatic nullifi-
cation of choice throughout pregnancy, including the first trimes-
ter. Despite widespread criticism of the Roe decision, Roe is still
the state of the law to which legislatures are bound. A constitu-
tional attack on the Life-Prolonging Procedure Act's pregnancy
provision is possible. However, it will be a rare situation for some-
one to have both the standing and the desire to make such a
challenge.
A positive aspect of the Florida legislation is that it clearly sets
out the physician's responsibility under the Act. If a treating phy-
sician refuses to comply with a declaration or treatment decision
made in accordance with the Act, he must make a reasonable effort
to transfer the patient to another physician." 2 In addition, health
care facilities and other persons acting under the direction of a
physician are clearly immunized from criminal and civil liability as
long as they comply with the provisions of the Act in good faith. 43
The Act also addresses the insurance issue generated by termi-
nation of life-sustaining treatment and declares that the withhold-
ing or the withdrawal of procedures in accordance with the Act
shall not constitute a suicide."4 The Act states that the failure to
make a declaration may not have insurance coverage
implications."
The valid declaration of any patient made prior to the effective
140. Ch. 84-58, § 12(2), 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 140.
141. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe holds that under the fourteenth amendment to the United
State Constitution, a state may not regulate the abortion procedure at all during the first
trimester of pregnancy and may not regulate it during the second trimester except insofar as
such regulation constitutes measures taken to protect maternal health. During the third
trimester, a state may regulate and prohibit abortions, except those necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother.
142. Ch. 84-58, § 8, 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 139. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Virginia do not specify penalties for physicians who
refuse to follow a declaration. The Florida Act does not specify a penalty, but does offer
direction.
143. Ch. 84-58, § 9, 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 139-40. Should litigation be brought under this
section, courts are likely to require a showing that the health care provider acted with the
intent to harm the patient. See supra note 109.
144. Ch. 84-58, § 12, 1984 Fla. Laws 136, 140.
145. Id.
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date of the Act, October 1, 1984, is to be given effect as provided in
the Act.'46
IV. CONCLUSION
Following years of inertia, both the Florida Supreme Court and
the Florida legislature recently decided the natural death issue in
favor of an individual's right to terminate life-sustaining proce-
dures under specified conditions. The Florida Supreme Court
failed to distinguish between "living will" cases and substituted
judgment cases and failed to maintain adequate procedural safe-
guards in its determination that a guardian need not be appointed
where substituted judgment is in fact required. The Florida legisla-
ture could have avoided the use of ambiguous language and should
not have left the pregnancy provision vulnerable to constitutional
attack. Overall, though, both branches of government acted admi-
rably in addressing the natural death issue, balancing the sensitive
interests involved, and setting out for health care providers, fami-
lies, and individuals the scope of their respective liabilities, respon-
sibilities, and rights.
146. Id.
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